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Abstract
In this study behavior in a Cournot duopoly with two production periods (the market clears only
after the second period) is compared to behavior in a standard one-period Cournot duopoly. Theory
predicts the endogenous emergence of a Stackelberg outcome in the two-period market. The results
of the experiments, however, reveal that in both markets (roughly) symmetric outcomes emerge and
that, after a short adaptation phase, average industry output in the two-period markets is the same as
in the standard one-period markets.
© 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
In the standard Cournot duopoly both ﬁrms are assumed to decide only once and simul-
taneouslyabouttheiroutputsbeforethemarketclears.Saloner(1987)analyzesanextended
market game allowing for two production periods before the market clears. In this model,
theinitialoutputschosenintheﬁrstproductionperiodbecomepubliclyknownbeforeﬁrms
decide about their additional non-negative outputs in the second production period. Only
after the second production period is the market price determined according to the total
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amount of output produced in both periods. Moreover, production costs are assumed to be
the same in both periods. Saloner shows that in case of constant marginal costs and linear
demand1 any outcome on the outer envelope of the best-response functions between and
includingtheﬁrms’Stackelbergpoints2 canbeachievedinasubgameperfectNashequilib-
rium of the two-period model. However, Ellingsen (1995) shows that only the Stackelberg
points survive the elimination of weakly dominated strategies. Thus, the interesting feature
of this model is that it predicts an asymmetric outcome even when ﬁrms are a-priori sym-
metric.Asaconsequencetotalquantityandwelfarearehigherthaninastandardone-period
Cournot market.
Another model in which duopolists are given more ﬂexibility in the timing of moves is
Hamilton and Slutsky’s (1990) extended game with action commitment in which two ﬁrms
may choose their action in one out of two periods. A ﬁrm may move early by committing
itself to a quantity, or it may wait until the second period and observe the other ﬁrm’s ﬁrst-
period action. Again, there are two endogenous Stackelberg equilibria with either ﬁrm as
the Stackelberg leader.3 While there also exists a simultaneous-move Cournot equilibrium
in pure strategies, this equilibrium is in weakly dominated strategies.
This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to investigate Saloner’s two-
period model with quantity competition and identical ﬁrms. In the experiment, ﬁxed pairs
of subjects are repeatedly matched to play the game. The results in the two-period market
are compared with results in standard one-period Cournot markets. Given the two models’
predictions, I shall focus on three research questions: (1) Do we observe the endogenous
emergence of Stackelberg outcomes in the two-period markets? (2) Will the two-period
markets (as in theory) yield higher total outputs at smaller prices than standard Cournot
markets, thus increasing total welfare?4 (3) What is the actual behavior in the two periods
of Saloner’s model?
There are several reasons why in an experimental setting of the two-period model it
is doubtful that one observes the endogenous emergence of a Stackelberg outcome. First,
Ellingsen’s result is based on iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies. Earlier
experiments, however, have demonstrated that subjects do not iteratively eliminate dom-
inated strategies but stop after one or very few rounds of reasoning.5 Second, there is a
coordination problem as there are two Stackelberg outcomes with either ﬁrm evolving as
the Stackelberg leader. In a symmetric setup, it is not clear how subjects can overcome
this coordination problem.6 Third, both subgame perfect equilibria imply large payoff dif-
1 Saloner actually allows for a much more general demand function. See Section 2 and especially footnote 15.
2 This is set E indicated in Fig. 1.
3 See Matsumura (1999), for a more general version of this model with more than two ﬁrms and with more than
two production periods.
4 In Huck et al. (2001) in which Stackelberg markets with exogenous role assignment are compared with
Cournot markets, it is found that although “pure” Stackelberg outcomes are rarely observed, total output in the
former markets are consistently higher than in the latter.
5 A stunning failure of subjects to go through longer chains of reasonings is reported in a recent paper by K¨ ubler
and Weizs¨ acker (2004) on informational cascades. For further evidence on subjects’ depth of reasoning see, for
example, the seminal work by Nagel (1995) or the more recent paper by Costa-Gomes et al. (2001).
6 van Damme and Hurkens (1999) analyze Hamilton and Slutsky’s extended game with action commitment in
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ferences. The extensive experimental evidence on for example the ultimatum game shows
that subjects display an aversion to disadvantageous inequality, suggesting that Stackelberg
outcomes are unlikely to evolve (see Fehr and Schmidt, 1999 and Bolton and Ockenfels,
2000). Finally, Huck et al. (2002) experimentally investigate the extended game with action
commitment of Hamilton and Slutsky mentioned above. The data does not conﬁrm the the-
ory. While Stackelberg equilibria are extremely rare, often endogenous Cournot outcomes
and sometimes collusive play are observed.
Notwithstanding these objections and those made elsewhere (e.g. in Pal, 1996) it seems
interestingandusefultoexplorehowexperimentalsubjectsbehaveinthetwo-periodmarket.
First of all, the two-period model seems to be more relevant than the one-period Cournot
model as real-world ﬁrms do have more ﬂexibility in the timing of decisions regarding
for example quantities (or capacities), as in the current model, or prices. It is then only
desirable to contrast theoretical results with empirical ﬁndings. Second, Saloner’s model is
part7 of the growing theoretical literature dealing with the endogenization of market struc-
tures. Instead of exogenously assuming modes of play (either simultaneous or sequential),
this literature tries to identify factors8 that might lead to the endogenous emergence of
leader-follower or simultaneous-move outcomes. It might then be fruitful to give theorists
feedback about the behavioral relevance of such factors by providing empirical evidence.
All the more so as the endogenous move structure in oligopoly settings is unlikely to be
settled purely on the basis of theoretical arguments. Third, Huck et al. (2002) employed
a random-matching scheme. One might argue that ﬁxed matching is more appropriate as
it might help subjects to overcome the inherent coordination problem. For example, with
repeated interaction, a player is more likely to successfully “teach” the other player. Also,
practitioners might suggest that ﬁxed matching is more relevant as in real-world markets
ﬁrmsinteractrepeatedly.Therefore,ﬁxedmatchingisemployedintheexperimentsreported
here. Finally, the two-period model might give rise to interesting dynamics and adaptation
patterns.
The experiments yield the following answers to the three questions asked above. First,
in both markets (roughly) symmetric outcomes emerge. Second, after a short adaptation
phase average industry output is the same in both markets and lower than predicted by
the traditional one-period Cournot model. Third, behavior in the individual two-period
markets is quite diverse ranging from pure collusive behavior to behavior that leads to
Cournot–Nash industry outputs. Furthermore, on average 83 percent of the total quantity in
thetwo-periodmarketsisproducedintheﬁrstproductionperiodand17percentinthesecond
period.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reiterates Saloner’s model
by means of the market parameters used in the experiments. Section 3 describes the exper-
to solve the inherent coordination problem they apply the tracing procedure (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988). As a
result, the Stackelberg equilibrium with the efﬁcient ﬁrm as the Stackelberg leader is selected.
7 In fact, it is one of the very ﬁrst in this area.
8 Besides more ﬂexibility in the timing of moves, such factors are, for example, whether ﬁrms can engage in
pre-play communication about the timing of moves or whether they can observe delay by rivals (Hamilton and
Slutsky), different risk attitudes in the presence of demand uncertainty (Spencer and Brandner, 1992; Kambhu,
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imental procedures. Section 4 presents the experimental results, and ﬁnally, Section 5
concludes.
2. Theory
In the following, I reiterate Saloner’s model along with its solution using the spe-
ciﬁc demand and cost functions implemented in the experiment. For the general result
see Saloner’s paper. For the sake of comparison, I shall use the notation adopted by
Saloner.
Consider a duopoly market with two production periods and assume that the market
clears only after the second period. Firms are assumed to have constant marginal costs
of ci =1,i=1, 2, respectively, no matter in which period production takes place. In the
ﬁrst production period, ﬁrms 1 and 2 simultaneously choose outputs q1
1 ≥ 0 and q2
1 ≥ 0,
respectively. These outputs become commonly known in the second production period
before ﬁrms simultaneously choose outputs q1
2 ≥ 0 and q2
2 ≥ 0. Firm i’s total output is
denoted by qi = qi
1 + qi
2. At the end of the second period, the market price is determined
bytheinversedemandfunctionP(q1 +q2)=100−(q1 +q2).Firmi’sbest-responsefunction
is given by:
Ri(qj) = arg max
qi
(99 − (qi + qj))qi =
1
2
(99 − qj). (1)
(Recall that ﬁrms have constant marginal costs of one.)
ItisstraightforwardtoshowthatinthestandardCournotmodelwithonlyoneproduction
period there exists a unique Nash equilibrium which is given by (N1, N2)=(33, 33).
Given the timing and the information conditions of the two-period game, a player’s
strategy must specify an output for period 1 and an output for period 2 where the latter
is a function of q1
1 and q2
1 (i.e., of the two ﬁrms’ ﬁrst-period outputs). A ﬁrm’s strategy is






Firm i’s unique Stackelberg leader output will be denoted by:
Si = arg max
qi
(99 − qi − Rj(qi))qi = 49.5,
that implies that ﬁrm j’s unique Stackelberg follower output is 24.75. Denote the outer
envelope of R1 and R2 by R and deﬁne E={(q1, q2)|(q1, q2)∈R, q1 ≤S1 and q2 ≤S2}. The
set E consisting of all points that lie on the reaction functions between the two Stackelberg
points is illustrated in Fig. 1. Saloner shows that the elements of E are the only outcomes
that can be sustained by subgame perfect Nash equilibria.9
However,asEllingsennotes,onlytheStackelbergpointssurvivetheiterativeelimination
of weakly dominated strategies. Intuitively, it is the threat that the follower will respond
optimally in the second period in case the leader underproduces in the ﬁrst period that
sustains the Stackelberg outcomes (see Saloner, p. 186).
9 For details, see Supplementary data.104 W. M¨ uller / J. of Economic Behavior & Org. 60 (2006) 100–111
Fig. 1. The ﬁrms’ best-response functions.
3. Experimental design
The computerized10 experiments were conducted at Humboldt University Berlin and at
Royal Holloway College (University of London) in November and December 2000.
Upon arrival in the lab subjects were assigned a computer screen and received writ-
ten instructions. After reading them, questions could be asked in private. All experiments
consisted of 25 rounds.
Subjects could choose quantities from a ﬁnite grid between 0 and 100 with 0.01 as
the smallest step. Hence, the action space had a sufﬁciently ﬁne grid such that continuous
action spaces were approximated. Therefore, the above benchmarks are also valid in the
10 We used the software tool kit z-Tree, developed by Fischbacher (1999).W. M¨ uller / J. of Economic Behavior & Org. 60 (2006) 100–111 105
experiment. The ﬁne grid also has the advantage that multiple Nash equilibria due to the
discretization of the action space (Holt, 1985) can be avoided.
There were two treatments. In treatment “TWO” the two-period duopoly as described in
the previous section was implemented. Additionally, as a control treatment, a standard one-
periodCournotduopoly(treatment“ONE”)wasrun.Inbothtreatmentsﬁxedmatchingwas
used.Foreachtreatment,10marketswereconducted:6two-periodand6one-periodmarkets
were conducted at Humboldt University and 4 two-period and 4 one-period markets were
conducted at Royal Holloway College. In all, 40 subjects participated in the experiments.
IntreatmentONE,subjectshadtodecideaboutthesinglequantitytheywantedtoproduce
in each round. In treatment TWO, however, subjects were informed that each round would
consist of two production periods in which production may take place. They were informed
that in the ﬁrst production period both ﬁrms would simultaneously decide which quantity
they want to produce in this production period and that, then, each ﬁrm would be informed
about the quantity the other ﬁrm has produced in the ﬁrst production period. Then both
ﬁrms would decide (again simultaneously) which additional quantity they want to produce
in the second production period. Furthermore, they were informed that also in the second
productionperiodonlynon-negativequantitiescouldbechosen.Thatis,itwasonlypossible
to increase the total quantity (or to leave it constant), but it was not possible to withdraw
some of the quantity that was produced in the ﬁrst production period.
Subjects had qualitative information about demand and cost conditions and were able to
determine the best reply to an anticipated quantity of the other ﬁrm. This information was
provided in the form of a ‘proﬁt calculator’ that worked as follows. When fed with data
regarding the other ﬁrm (total quantity of the other ﬁrm), the calculator allowed them to try
out the consequences of their own actions. Note that a proﬁt calculator gives qualitatively
thesameinformationasaproﬁttable,whichisoftenprovidedinCournotexperiments(e.g.,
Holt). Moreover, the proﬁt calculator might help participants to avoid a bias due to limited
computational capabilities of subjects. In the second production period of treatment TWO,
subjects were asked to feed the proﬁt calculator with an additional quantity of their own
ﬁrm and an additional quantity of the other ﬁrm. The proﬁt calculator would then compute
the proﬁt that results from the total quantities of both ﬁrms.
AftereachroundintreatmentONE,subjectswereinformedabouttheirownquantityand
proﬁt and the quantity of the other ﬁrm. In treatment TWO, they were informed about their
own and the competitor’s ﬁrst-period output before deciding about second-period outputs.
After the whole round (consisting of two periods) was completed, subjects were informed
about their own quantities and their own proﬁt and the quantities of the other ﬁrm.
Whereas one-period market sessions lasted about 45min, two-period market sessions
lasted about 1h and 20min. On average subjects earned about US$15.
4. Experimental results
Recall that theory predicts that a Stackelberg outcome will emerge in treatment TWO.
As a result the ﬁrm emerging as a leader should produce a quantity of 49.5 whereas the ﬁrm
emerging as a follower is expected to produce a quantity of 24.75 resulting in total output
of 74.25. In contrast to this, in treatment ONE both ﬁrms are expected to produce a quantity106 W. M¨ uller / J. of Economic Behavior & Org. 60 (2006) 100–111
of33resultinginatotaloutputof66.Asaconsequence,thetwo-periodmarketintreatment
TWO yields higher total welfare when compared to the standard Cournot duopoly market
in treatment ONE. So the ﬁrst two questions I will answer in this section are:
Question 1. Do we observe the endogenous emergence of Stackelberg outcomes in
treatment TWO?
Question 2. Will the two-period markets in treatment TWO yield higher total outputs
at smaller prices than standard Cournot markets in treatment ONE, thus, increasing total
welfare?
Finally, I will answer
Question 3. What is the actual behavior in the two periods of Saloner’s model?
4.1. Question 1
Do we observe the endogenous emergence of Stackelberg outcomes in treatment TWO?
Recall that the Stackelberg outcome has one ﬁrm producing a quantity of 49.5 while the
other ﬁrm produces a quantity of 24.75 which in a experimental setup is clearly too rigid.






27.5]. Applying this criterion, it turns out that only 8 out of 250 cases can be classiﬁed as
Stackelberg outcomes. These eight cases, stemming from seven different markets, all occur
in the ﬁrst 10 rounds and not later.11 Thus it appears that subjects did not even seriously
attempt to establish themselves as Stackelberg leaders. In sum, it seems fair to conclude




no, they do not. Table 1 shows summary statistics for the two treatments classiﬁed by blocs
of rounds. The upper part of Table 1 shows total industry output in the two treatments. The
lowerpartofthisTableshowsindustryoutputinTreatmentTWOforeachproductionperiod
separately.InspectingtotalquantitiesasgivenintheupperpartofTable1andconcentrating
on inexperienced behavior as represented in rounds 1–8, we observe the following: though
averagetotalquantityintreatmentTWOiswith65.16higherthanintreatmentONE(60.24),
thesedifferencesturnoutnotbestatisticallysigniﬁcantatareasonablelevel(p=0.241,two-
tailed Mann–Whitney U-test).12 Note that according to Table 1, behavior in treatment ONE
is remarkably stable over time. In contrast, in treatment TWO we observe that average
quantities drop from a level close to the Nash equilibrium prediction during the ﬁrst bloc
to about the same level as in treatment ONE in blocs 2 and 3. Indeed, employing again a
11 Inspecting the data regarding the question whether many outcomes would fall only slightly short of this
criterion, it turns out that there are only two more cases that might be classiﬁed as a Stackelberg outcome: (50,
29) and (45, 21). Each of these outcomes stem from one of the seven markets mentioned in the text.
12 Here, one group’s average total output over the rounds of the considered bloc of the experiment was taken as
one observation.W. M¨ uller / J. of Economic Behavior & Org. 60 (2006) 100–111 107
Table 1










ONE total output 60.24 (19.23) 60.62 (12.10) 60.06 (13.68) 65.79 (7.55) 60.53 (15.05)
TWO total output 65.16 (14.51) 60.93 (13.05) 59.54 (8.59) 66.40 (4.14) 62.06 (12.30)
Treatment TWO: total quantities in each period
TWO total output
in period 1
52.54 (14.49) 51.41 (9.87) 49.71 (10.84) 53.80 (9.17) 51.32 (11.81)
TWO total output
in period 2
12.63 (8.78) 9.51 (10.24) 9.82 (10.50) 12.60 (8.85) 10.73 (9.88)
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.
Mann–Whitney U-test this time to experienced behavior (i.e., to total quantities in bloc 3
in both treatments) conﬁrms what seems to be obvious to the naked eye: industry output in




industry output of 66 units.
4.3. Question 3
What is the actual behavior in the two periods of Saloner’s model? To answer this
questionletusﬁrstconcentrateonaggregateddata.ThelowerpartofTable1showsaverage
industry output in Treatment TWO separately for each production period. Let us consider
experienced behavior as observed during rounds 17–24. According to Table 1, the average
totaloutputintheﬁrstproductionperiodis49.71(whichalmostcoincideswiththecollusive
industry output of 49.5). According to subgame perfect behavior as described by Eq. (3)
in Supplementary data, in this case the average market is expected to produce a quantity in
the second production period such that the total quantity in both periods equals the Nash
equilibrium output of 66. That is, on average we should observe a total industry output of
66−49.71=16.29 in the second production period. However, we observe that on average
a market produces a quantity of only 9.82 in the second production period.
However, instead of trying to explain this average pattern, let us inspect individual mar-
kets. Table 2 displays mean data as observed in rounds 17–24 in each individual market
(ordered according to increasing total output). Here, as in the formulation of the two-period
model above, qi
1(qi
2), i=1, 2 denotes the individual quantity produced in period 1 (period
2), qi = qi
1 + qi
2 denotes total individual quantity and Q=q1 +q2 denotes industry output
at the end of the second production period.
Inspecting Table 2, it turns out that behavior in the individual markets is diverse, ranging
from purely collusive behavior (as in markets 1 and 2) to Cournot–Nash behavior (most
purely in market 9). All in all, ﬁve markets can be classiﬁed as collusive (markets 1–5) and






















































Average quantities in each market in rounds 17–24 in treatment TWO





2 q1 q2 Q
12 5 .00 (0.00) 25.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 25.00 (0.00) 25.00 (0.00) 50.00 (0.00)
22 5 .00 (0.00) 25.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 25.00 (0.00) 25.00 (0.00) 50.00 (0.00)
32 5 .00 (0.00) 25.00 (0.00) 2.38 (3.89) 1.00 (0.00) 27.38 (3.89) 26.00 (0.00) 53.38 (3.89)
41 6 .13 (10.56) 18.75 (5.18) 13.13 (13.74) 6.25 (5.18) 29.25 (7.44) 25.00 (0.00) 54.25 (7.44)
52 0 .00 (0.00) 21.00 (2.88) 9.25 (3.81) 4.88 (2.70) 29.25 (3.81) 25.88 (2.10) 55.13 (4.61)
62 6 .25 (5.55) 23.38 (8.23) 3.50 (4.93) 9.00 (8.11) 29.75 (2.76) 32.38 (0.92) 62.13 (3.52)
72 0 .00 (0.00) 30.00 (0.00) 10.00 (0.00) 5.00 (0.00) 30.00 (0.00) 35.00 (0.00) 65.00 (0.00)
82 8 .00 (3.16) 30.00 (8.45) 7.38 (4.14) 2.50 (3.78) 35.38 (4.50) 32.50 (5.98) 67.88 (9.69)
93 3 .13 (0.64) 34.63 (0.74) 0.00 (0.00) 0.50 (0.93) 33.13 (0.64) 35.13 (0.83) 68.25 (1.04)
10 22.88 (12.81) 23.00 (4.54) 12.25 (11.17) 11.25 (4.17) 35.13 (2.23) 34.25 (2.19) 69.38 (3.16)
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Table 3
Average quantities in the four classes of subagmes in treatment TWO
Class of subgame Rounds 1–24 Rounds 17–24
Av. obs. q2 Av. opt. q2 N Av. obs. q2 Av. opt. q2 N
I2 .52 0.00 44 0.63 0.00 16
II 5.38 9.78 364 5.59 9.95 132
III 3.39 0.00 36 0.00 0.00 6
IV 10.21 7.15 36 6.33 3.42 6
last third of the experiment. Note also that Table 2 provides no evidence for the endogenous
emergence of Stackelberg outcomes in treatment TWO.
Comparing total individual quantities of the two ﬁrms in a market as shown in Table 2,
it seems fair to conclude that on average roughly equal market shares evolve. However, in
some of the groups market shares are quite different. This is particularly so in market 7
and (to a lesser degree) in market 4. In market 7, for example ﬁrm 1 earns in all rounds
of the third bloc 14.3 percent less than ﬁrm 2. Although, as it is evident by now, there
are almost no outcomes that resemble Stackelberg market shares, one might ask whether
market shares in treatment TWO are on average more uneven than in treatment ONE. To
answer this question, I assign to each of the individual markets (for each round separately)
the number s=max{q1,q2}/min{q1,q2}.13 As it turns out, in rounds 1–24 the average s for
treatment ONE is only slightly higher than the average s in treatment TWO: 1.29 versus
1.17 (standard deviation: 0.67 versus 0.26). In rounds 17–24 similar numbers emerge: 1.20
versus1.10(standarddeviation:0.77versus0.13).Infact,applyingaMann–WhitneyU-test
to each round (neglecting non-independence across rounds) reveals that the differences are
insigniﬁcant in each round. Note, furthermore, that differences across markets are smaller
within treatment TWO as standard deviations in this treatment are smaller than in treatment
ONE.




best-response to the other ﬁrm’s ﬁrst-period output) in class II (IV). Table 3 shows average
observedsecond-periodquantitiesinallofthesefourclassesalongwiththeaveragequantity
that would have been optimal according to the subgame perfect equilibrium, separately for
rounds 1–24 and 17–24 (experienced behavior). Several observations are in order. First,
in accordance with what was said above, most observations belong to class II (i.e., to the
case in which both ﬁrms have produced less than the Cournot–Nash output in the ﬁrst
period): 364 out of 480 cases (rounds 1–24) and 132 out of 160 cases (rounds 17–24).
Second, no matter which time interval one considers, on average ﬁrms produce less than
what would have been optimal in class II: 5.38 versus 9.78 (rounds 1–24) and 5.59 versus
9.95 (rounds 17–24). That is, as we already know, on average ﬁrms do not produce up to
13 TherearetworoundsintreatmentONE,inwhichoneﬁrmproduced0.Therefore,thesetwocasesareexcluded.110 W. M¨ uller / J. of Economic Behavior & Org. 60 (2006) 100–111
the Cournot–Nash quantity as it is required by subgame perfect behavior in this class. In
other words, ﬁrms act somewhat collusively. Third, again independent of the time interval
considered, on average ﬁrms produce more than what would have been optimal in class IV:
10.21 versus 7.15 (rounds 1–24) and 6.33 versus 3.42 (rounds 17–24). Note that in class IV,
the other ﬁrm’s ﬁrst-period output can be much higher than the ﬁrst-period output of the
own ﬁrm. Thus, an output beyond of what would have been optimal can be interpreted as an
attempt to balance market shares. Fourth, subjects appear to have learned over time to cease
production in classes I and III: average observed quantities in periods 17–24 are (close to)
0 in these cases whereas this is not the case in the ﬁrst two-thirds of the experiment which
becomes apparent by looking at the respective numbers in periods 1–24. In all, it appears
that learning leads to second-period behavior that over time moves closer to the subgame
perfect equilibrium prediction.
5. Discussion
Giving ﬁrms more ﬂexibility with regard to the timing of decisions, Saloner stud-
ies an extension of the standard Cournot model by allowing ﬁrms to produce in each
of two periods before the market clears. As a result, a continuum of equilibria arises
in this model: all points in the outer envelope of the best-response functions between
and including the Stackelberg points can be sustained as subgame perfect Nash equi-
libria. However, as noted by Ellingsen, only the Stackelberg points survive the iterated
elimination of weakly dominated strategies. Thus, even a-priori symmetric ﬁrms are pre-
dicted to end up in asymmetric positions. Contrary to this prediction, the main result
reported in this paper is that about symmetric outcomes emerge in the experimental two-
period markets. Moreover, when subjects are experienced, average industry outputs in
two-period markets are the same as in one-period Cournot markets. Also, the bulk of the
industry output (namely on average 83 percent) is produced during the ﬁrst production
period.
The endogenous emergence of Stackelberg outcomes in experimental duopoly markets
with ﬂexible timing appears in the light of the experimental results presented here and
elsewhere14 as very unlikely. Thus, more theoretical work is needed to explain why asym-
metric equilibria do not emerge often when players are symmetric. Some reasons why
this is not the case seems to be the following. First, subjects’ aversion to disadvantageous
inequality as conceptualized in, for example, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and
Ockenfels (2000) seem to be too strong to allow symmetric (as well as asymmetric) ﬁrms
to end up in asymmetric positions. Second, subjects appear not to see a way to get around
the coordination problem that plagues asymmetric outcomes.
Finally, as earlier studies show, too, subjects do not iteratively eliminate dominated
strategies (over “many” rounds).
14 As mentioned in the introduction, Huck et al. (2002) test Hamilton and Slutsky’s extended Cournot model
with action commitment and symmetric ﬁrms. Fonseca et al. (2005) test the same model with asymmetric ﬁrms.
van Damme and Hurkens predict for this case that the low-cost ﬁrm should emerge as the Stackelberg leader.
However, Stackelberg outcomes are, again, extremely rare.W. M¨ uller / J. of Economic Behavior & Org. 60 (2006) 100–111 111
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